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Abstract 
 
Centrally planned economies tend to be less efficient than economies in which agents 
are free to choose their output targets, as well as the means to meet them. This paper presents 
a simple model of planner-manager interactions and shows how planned economies can end 
up in a low-effort, low-output equilibrium even though they may have started in a high-
effort, high-output equilibrium. 
 
 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
Centrally planned economies are usually less efficient than those economies in which 
agents are free to choose their output targets, as well as the means to meet them. Indeed, in 
the long run, market economies have outperformed command ones by a wide margin. 
However, disagreements remain regarding what is the main source of this difference. Is it the 
technical impossibility of designing an efficient plan or inability to implement such a plan? 
And why did most of these economies grow fast initially after planning was introduced, but 
slowed down later? We argue that the poor long-term growth performance of centrally 
planned economies is related to the nature of the contract between the planner and the 
managers used in these economies. A hypothetical optimal contract could be neither 
constructed nor implemented, given the real-life constraints: penalties for underperformance 
could not be applied easily, and the planner could not design￿for the complexity of and high 
cost to the economy￿individualized contracts with firms. 
We model an economy in which the planner may not offer sufficient incentives to 
firm managers to sustain high-effort, high-output outcomes, and, as a result, managers switch - 2  - 
 
to low-effort, leading to low-output outcome. The planner and firms are mutually dependent, 
that is, they lose if either plan targets are missed or these targets are set too low. Our goal 
was to construct a simple model of planner-manager interactions and show how such a 
planned economy may end up in an inefficient, low-effort equilibrium. The model is 
consistent with the empirical evidence from eight Central and Eastern European (CEE) 
countries during 1948-89, namely, that the growth decline was systemic in nature. 
  The paper is organized as follows. First, we review the selected literature and stylized 
facts of planned systems, paying particular attention to CEE countries and their growth 
deceleration. Second, we formulate the objective functions of the planner and firm managers, 
discuss the contract between them, and assess the growth and welfare implications. 
 
II.   CENTRALLY PLANNED ECONOMIES: WHY ARE THEY INEFFICIENT? 
One of the main debates of the twentieth century was about the economic efficiency 
of planned economies and the comparative analysis was mostly seen as a competition 
between the capitalist West and communist East. However, the latter generalization means 
little￿the actual institutional structures differed markedly both among individual planned 
economies (say, the U.S.S.R. vs. Yugoslavia) and over time (say, Hungary in the 1950s vs. 
Hungary in the 1980s). At the same time, these systems have had a lot in common: in general 
terms, this debate has been about the economics of bureaucracy, as discussed in Olson 
(2000). For example, the literature on information sharing between a regulator and a firm in a 
market economy (Baron and Besanko, 1984) is a mirror image of the ￿optimal tautness￿ 
literature on planning (Hunter, 1961; or Keren, 1991). 
How do we define planned systems? Unlike in market systems, where the profit 
motive is the driving force, in planning systems the issue is how administrative pressure - 3  - 
 
applied by the planner affects effort exerted by firms. We argue that in these systems the 
state either owns the means of production or has control over long-term investment decisions, 
and resources are allocated predominantly￿but not necessarily exclusively￿through 
planning. As a result, firms and consumers have a narrower set of permissible activities than 
agents in market economies. In the next part, after outlining the CEE postwar growth record, 
we discuss the competing theories of the growth decline and describe the institutional setting 
of our model. 
Central and Eastern European Economies: The Growth Record During 1949-89 
Fast growth in the CEE economies (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, the 
German Democratic Republic, Romania, the U.S.S.R., and Yugoslavia), following postwar 
recovery and nationalization, lasted less than two decades. A few basic observations warrant 
attention. First, the rate of growth of net material product (NMP) was high at the beginning 
of the period. Despite being denied access to their previously dominant foreign markets, 
missing out on transfers under the Marshall Plan, and having to reengineer their economies, 
the eight CEE countries started with NMP growth rates averaging in the double digits in the 
early 1950s (Figure 1). Even after taking into account measurement problems,
3 the available 
data show that the CEE economies grew faster than most developed market economies in 
1950-65 (Murrell and Olson, 1991). Second, the rates of growth began to decline some 10-15 
years after the introduction of planning.
 Third, all economies grew at closely correlated rates 
and the major turning points were essentially identical for all of them. 
                                                 
3 First, the CEE countries may have overestimated real output figures. According to Havlik 
(1983), the true real rate of growth of NMP was on average lower by some 1-2 percentage 
points than that published officially, owing to improperly estimated price indices. However, 
as Leamer and Taylor (1999) documented, it is unlikely that this bias was more prevalent in 
the 1950s than in, for example, the 1980s.  - 4  - 
 
In the 1960s and early 1970s, the average rate slowed to about 5-8 percent and, 
thereafter, decelerated gradually to nil at 1988-89. At the same time, population grew 
modestly, and capital accumulation remained high, hence, the decline was attributable to a 
negative trend in total factor productivity (Pollard, 1991). On average, the rate of growth 
deceleration was between ￿0.1 and ￿0.2 percentage point per annum during the 1949-89 
period. It is worth noting that the growth decay began long before the first oil shock and the 
rate of growth declined in both oil-exporting and oil-importing countries. 
  Could the U.S.S.R. growth slowdown explain the performance in the rest of the CEE 
countries? We are not convinced. First, BrixiovÆ and Bul￿ř (2001) observed that the cyclical 
fluctuations of the Soviet output were uncorrelated with all but a few of CEE countries. 
Second, it is unclear through which channels the shocks would propagate. As shown by Ickes 
(1990a), intra-regional trade fluctuations were not causing growth fluctuations, owing, in 
part, to infrequently adjusted prices and exchange rates, and negotiated volumes of trade. 
Finally, the political cycles of individual CEE countries were unsynchronized (Adam, 1989). 
What Else May Explain the Growth Decline in the CEE Countries? 
Several explanations were put forward. The initial growth spur was attributed to 
massive factor mobilization following nationalization of most industries, that is, the so-called 
extensive growth policies.
4 The eventual deceleration is then attributed to the exhaustion of 
the initial factor stimulus, poor macroeconomic policies (Brada, 1989), the slow adjustment 
to the oil and debt-crisis shocks (Murrell, 1990), excessive defense spending (Landau, 1994), 
credit shocks (Bul￿ř, 1998), and so on. However, relatively high rates of growth were 
                                                 
4 Unsustainability of the ￿extensive growth￿ policies without technological progress was 
recognized as early as in the late 1950s by policymakers in the CMEA countries (Adam, 
1989). Weitzman (1970) and Ofer (1987) define the extensive growth model. - 5  - 
 
sustained into the early 1970s, two decades past the initial factor mobilization and bad 
policies were present throughout the sample period. 
  Others argued that the planned economies overinvested in fixed capital and that low 
substitution between capital and labor caused "acute diminishing returns to capital."
5 
Although the ￿overinvestment￿ model fits time series of some countries reasonably well (say, 
the U.S.S.R. or Czechoslovakia),
6 the growth performance in the 1950s was exceptional even 
after controlling for investment (Easterly and Fischer, 1995).
7 These theories did not 
examine, however, optimizing behavior of agents in these economies and, hence, they 
explained neither why the particular type of technology was chosen, nor who chose it.
8 
Yet another group of economists focused on the coordination problem of central 
planning (Hayek, 1940), stressing the problems entailed in introducing and evaluating 
innovations. A version of this explanation is the Kornai￿s (1980) concept of shortage, where 
growth rates under central planning have come down because producers could not find inputs 
in the quality or variety they needed.
9 Unfortunately, these theories are silent on why it took 
                                                 
5 Sapir (1980) and Rusek (1989) estimated the elasticity of substitution of production factors 
for Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia at about 0.1. These estimates contrast with the almost 
unitary elasticity found in other extensively growing, but nonsocialist countries (see Easterly 
and Fischer (1995) for a review). 
6 See, for example, Easterly and Fischer (1995) and Klacek and Ne￿porovÆ (1984). 
7 HernÆndez-CatÆ (2000) demonstrated the ambiguous impact of investment in the case of 
Cuba: the total factor productivity component can dominate the medium-term rate of growth. 
8 In several CEE countries the firms themselves made some of the technology decisions and 
small-scale investment was completely decentralized during the 1980s. Parsons (1986) and 
Bul￿ř (1995) discussed this feature for the G.D.R. and Czechoslovakia, respectively. 
9 See Banerjee and Spagat (1992) and (1991) for some theoretical models. - 6  - 
 
20 or so years for the rate of growth to slow down, or why the rate of growth declined in all 
countries, irrespective of their innovation cycle or the severity of shortages (Dlouh￿, 1990). 
What has been missing in all the explanations provided was a microeconomic 
foundation of these explanations that would tie together the effects of economic policies and 
institutional features of the planning system? Promising inroads had been made by several 
principal agent studies, such as those by Freixas, Guesnerie, and Tirole (1985) or Keren 
(1991), and we will employ their apparatus.
10 We extend their static, partial equilibrium 
models into a general equilibrium one. By introducing technological progress, we can 
examine how these economies evolve over time. Also, rather than maximizing total welfare 
(output) in the economy, our central planner￿s objective is to maximize his/her own 
consumption. 
 
III.   AN ECONOMY WHERE EVERYBODY WANTS TO MEET THE TARGETS 
Stylized facts 
In this section, we summarize stylized facts about the planner-manager relationship 
that we explore formally in the following sections. First, the planning authority knew neither 
the true production functions of individual firms nor their capacity utilization. On the one 
hand, firms had a vested interest to hide this information to ensure both contemporaneous 
and future plan compliance. On the other hand, the planner possessed only a rudimentary 
monitoring technology. Although this is a well-known feature of planned economies, many 
models assumed some Bayesian learning processes through which the planner can eventually 
                                                 
10 See Keren (1993) for a review of these types of models. - 7  - 
 
learn the firms￿ true production functions. In contrast, we assume that the planner knew only 
the distribution of production functions in the economy as a whole. 
Second, the planner was concerned about compliance as much as the individual firms 
because he was penalized for economy-wide underperformance. Hence, the planner was 
motivated to set the plan such as to minimize the risk of missing the plan targets.
11 
Consequently, we see the planner as a selfish agent maximizing his own utility by keeping a 
portion of output for himself as opposed to maximizing "welfare of the people." At the same 
time, plan targets had to be above some threshold, such as last year￿s output. Poorly designed 
plans, or even unsuccessful plans owing to exogenous shocks, had ruinous effects for their 
authors: from executions in the 1920s U.S.S.R. to more gentle career consequences later on. 
It is interesting to note that practically no annual or five-year plans were officially declared 
off trackCthere is ample evidence that either the plan targets were lowered halfway through 
the planning period,
12 or the actual, firm-level outturn was falsified, with the tacit approval of 
the planner.
13 Of course, this was possible because both planners and firm managers 
belonged to the same elite. 
  Third, penalties for underperformance declined over time. Who would punish firms 
for underperformance and the planner for poor plans, and can an ￿optimal punishment￿ be 
                                                 
11 This argument has somehow never become a part of the mainstream thinking about 
planned economies. SeeBrada (1978), HlavÆček (1990), or Ickes (1990b) for risk minimizing 
behavior under planning. 
12 See Keren (1982) for evidence on ex post adjustments, both down and up, of 
macroeconomic planning targets in the German Democratic Republic.  
13 Mlčoch (1990) described the so-called planning games used in the former Czechoslovakia 
to fulfill formally the plan at the margin (price changes, changes in structure of output, 
overinvoicing, end-period inventory repurchase agreements, etc). The planning games are an 
analogue to the ￿storming￿ pattern of enterprise behavior (Alexeev, 1991). - 8  - 
 
devised? In most of these countries, either a dictator or a collective body oversaw the 
economy and set penalties. The penalties were quite harsh initially, however, the ruler(s) 
soon recognized the declining efficiency of terror, as managers were not willing to accept 
responsibility for risky projects.
14 The empirical literature unambiguously suggests that the 
penalty for nonperformance declined both in relative and absolute terms as exhibited, for 
example, by bureaucrats￿ tenure (Faith and Short, 1995). The evidence also suggests that the 
planner had limited control over workers￿ consumption￿wages in percent of NMP were 
increasing in all countries. 
Fourth, planning limited the set of permissible activities and￿following the increase 
in personal consumption￿offered comparatively low return to effort. A manager would not 
receive a portion of the profit owing to a newly introduced product. After achieving the 
average, ￿guaranteed￿ standard of living, managers and workers had little chance of wealth 
accumulation as ￿law abiding citizens.￿
15 In the end, all CEE economies had compressed 
distributions of personal incomes￿their Gini coefficients were some one-half of their value 
in countries with comparable GDP per capita. 
The framework 
The economy in our model consists of two types of agents: a large number of managers, M, 
with population normalized to 1, and one planner, P. All agents live for two periods, t=1,2, 
                                                 
14 The only country where the punishment seemed to have increased over time was 
Cambodia under the Pol Pot rule in the 1980s. 
15 Once a manager or worker received his (state-owned) accommodation, bought (the only 
available) car, and perhaps also built his weekend cottage, he knew that he reached his bliss 
point. On the one hand, additional effort would yield some extra income for which the 
worker would have little use. On the other hand, once he reached his bliss point, the value of 
leisure increased dramatically: shirking was widespread in the CEE economies. - 9  - 
 
and have the same risk-neutral preferences ∑
=
2
1
) (
t
i
t c E , where 
i
t c  is the consumption of a single 
good in period t by an agent  ) , ( P M i = and E denotes expectation formed at the beginning of 
each period. Agents are endowed with an amount w of the consumption good in each period.  
At the beginning of each period, managers choose how much effort,  t x , they will put 
into production. This costs them  t x γ  units of consumption good, where  1 0 < < γ .
  The effort, 
known only to the manager, can take on two values: high (H), where  1 = t x  or low (L) where 
0 = t x . In period t, each manager can produce output  t y  using  t x  amount of effort according 
to a production function: 
                                      ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( t L t x t H t x t z z y φ φ − + =            (1) 
where  ) (t x φ  denotes probability, conditional on the effort x, that the output is high,  ) (t H z , and 
) 1 ( ) (t x φ − that it is low,  ) (t L z , where  0 ) ( ) ( > > t L t H z z . Hence  H φ  is the probability of output 
being high, given high effort, and  L φ  is the probability of output being high in period t, given 
low effort, where  L H φ φ > . Also,  ) (t x φ  is i.i.d. variable.  
The economy experiences exogenous technological progress, ε , between periods 1 
and 2. In period 1, managers produce output  H z  in ￿high output state￿, and output  L z  in ￿low 
output state￿. In period 2, managers produce  ε + H z  in ￿high output state￿ and  ε + L z  in 
￿low output state￿, that is, output increases between period 1 and 2 by ε  in both high- and 
low-effort states. Since this technological progress is the only difference between period one 
and two, we suppress the time subscript from now on. 
Every period, each manager then chooses consumption,  ,
M c  and effort,  x, to solve 
the following consumption problem: -  10 - 
 
) ( max ,
M
x c c E                                  (2) 
subject to 
]} ) 1 ( )[ 1 ( ] ) 1 ( [ { L L H L L H H H
M z z x z z x w x c φ φ φ φ λ γ − + − + − + + ≤ +  
where λ  is the share of output that the manager can keep.
  
Prior to the beginning of each period, the planner chooses a contract to maximize his 
consumption. The contract is a set of explicit payoffs (output shares) to the manager, 
conditional on the publicly observable output, and a set of residual payoffs to the planner. 
Contracts can take many forms, some very complex. In reality, most CEE countries used a 
simple version of the linear contract and we focus on this particular type of arrangement. It is 
a couple  ) , ( L H s s s =  determining payoffs to the planner as  ] ) 1 ( , ) 1 [( L H
P z z s λ λ − − = , 
where λ , 1 0 ≤ ≤ λ  is the share of output that the manager can keep.
16 
 The planner has an obligation to announce publicly a planned aggregate output  ) ￿ (Y  
and this information is used by the public to monitor output performance ex post. Since the 
contracts designed by the planner are incentive compatible and the aggregate production 
technology is public information, the planner knows what effort managers will put into 
production and to what aggregate output such effort would lead; consequently, the actual 
output  ) (Y  equals the plan.
17  
                                                 
16 In reality, the share of output collected by the planner, (1-λ), is not necessarily consumed 
by the planner himself; he probably collects only its portion, α . For simplicity, we set α to 1 
and (1-λ) then represents a share of output confiscated by the state. 
17 This model abstracts from monitoring problems and corruption. Two possible types of 
problems could be: (i) managers producing high output do not surrender the adequate shares, 
an analogue of tax evasion, and, (ii) high aggregate output is produced, but managers and the 
planner announce to the ruler that low output was produced and split the difference. -  11 - 
 
In deciding the payoffs, the planner is constrained by several requirements. First, 
managers￿ individual consumption must stay above their reservation level, cmin,  in both 
periods.
18 
 Second, if the plan/output is below its potential, the planner pays a fine τ . We 
assume that the fine, which can be interpreted as a punishment for ￿failing the trust￿ of the 
ruler, is exogenous and identical in both periods.
19  The planner thus chooses his 
consumption, ,
P c  and managers￿ payoffs, λ , to solve the following: 
P
c c λ , max                                                                      (3) 
subject to  
{} τ φ φ φ φ λ γ − − + − + − + − + ≤ + ] ) 1 ( )[ 1 ( ] ) 1 ( [ ) 1 ( L L H L L H H H
P z z x z z x w x c  
and subject to manager￿s condition on minimum consumption:  min c c
M ≥ . 
The model is closed with two market clearing conditions. The first condition states 
that in both periods the aggregate consumption of managers and the planner equals the 
aggregate endowments and net production.  
τ φ φ φ φ − − + − + − + + ≤ + ] ) 1 ( )[ 1 ( ] ) 1 ( [ 2 L L H L L H H H
M P z z x z z x w c c    (4) 
                                                 
18 We restrict parameters to  0 min > > > γ w c , where  min c is the managers￿ reservation 
consumption. This guarantees that the endowment of a manager is high enough to cover cost 
of high effort, but too low to cover minimum consumption, hence, giving him an incentive to 
produce.  
19 The potential aggregate output in period t is the aggregate output under high effort. As 
discussed earlier, we believe that the assumption of a fixed fine corresponds well to the 
reality of planned economies. Fines were neither increasing in time nor fixed as ratios of total 
output. In determining the size of the fine, the planner was limited by political-economy 
constraints. Hypothetically, two types of fine are possible: for setting too low targets, 
corresponding to our τ , and for not meeting the plan  ) ￿ ( Y Y < . In our model, however, the 
plan is always met and the second fine cannot be binding.  -  12 - 
 
The second condition states that the sum of shares of managers producing high output,  H m , 
and managers producing low output,  L m , equals the total supply of managers, where 
H H m φ =  if  1 = x , and  L H m φ =  if  0 = x .
20 
Formally, 
1 = + L H m m .                                (5) 
The equilibrium in this model is defined as the allocation of consumption and 
managers, and a set of payoffs to managers such that: (i) taking the set of payoffs as given, 
managers choose each period how much effort,  x, to put into production in order to 
maximize their utility of consumption, (ii) knowing the behavior of managers, the planner 
chooses each period the set of payoffs, λ  to maximize his utility, and (iii) the markets for 
managers and products clear. 
Characterization of Equilibrium 
By solving the managers￿ maximization problem, we find that high effort (x=1) is the 
optimal choice when 
γ φ φ λ ≥ − − ) )( ( ) L H L H z z .              (6) 
In other words, high effort is optimal only if the marginal benefit of higher consumption from 
the extra effort,  ) )( ( L H L H z z − −φ φ λ , exceeds the marginal cost of that effort, γ.  
The planner chooses λ , taking behavior of managers, described by (3), as given. His 
choices are twofold. First, the planner can select the smallest share of output that would 
stimulate managers to achieve high-effort output, that is,
  
                                                 
20 Note that since the population of managers is normalized to 1 and all mangers are 
identical, the probability of each manager producing high output given the effort x,  x φ , also 
represents the portion of all managers producing high output.  
(continued￿) -  13 - 
 
) )( ( L H L H
H z z − −
=
φ φ
γ
λ  .                            (7) 
On the aggregate level this would lead to achieving the potential output in both periods, 
however, the planner gets a smaller share of a bigger pie. Output is higher, but the planner 
leaves a bigger share of it to managers.
 21  
Second, the planner can select the lowest share of output guaranteeing reservation 
consumption of managers,  min λ . By offering low-effort incentives, the planner gets a larger 
share of a smaller pie: 
L
M
z
w c γ
λ
+ −
=
min
min ,      (8) 
How will the planner decide? Obviously, the planner will provide high-effort 
incentives (the first option) if the loss of share of output to the planner caused by higherλ is 
compensated for by a higher aggregate output accruing to him.  Formally, the following must 
be true for the planner to choose the high-effort option: 
≥ − H H Y ) 1 ( λτ λ − − L Y ) 1 ( min ,       (9) 
where  L H H H H z z Y ) 1 ( φ φ − + =  and  L L H L L z z Y ) 1 ( φ φ − + = . In other words, the planner 
provides high-effort incentives and announces an output plan consistent with those incentives 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
21 In case when condition (7) would not guarantee minimum consumption for the managers, 
λ would become 
L z
w c γ
λ
+ −
=
min . -  14 - 
 
if and only if the fine for the low output is bigger than the difference between the planner￿s 
shares of output under low effort and high effort:
22 
                  ) )( ( min L H L H L H H z z Y Y − − − − ≥ φ φ λ λ τ                                                 (10)                          
In this model, three output outcomes therefore can occur in equilibrium. First, high 
aggregate output is produced in both periods, (H, H). Second, low aggregate output is 
produced in both periods, (L, L). Finally, high aggregate output is produced in the first 
period, but low aggregate output is produced in the second period, (H, L).
23 These outcomes 
depend on the parameters of the model and, consequently, on the shares of output that the 
planner offers to the managers. While the (H, H) outcome has been the goal of planning, we 
focus on the outcome in which the managers reduce their effort in the second period, (H, L).  
The case when high aggregate output is produced in the first period, but low output is 
produced in the second period, is relevant for explaining the growth slowdown that has 
occurred in the centrally planned economies. Under this scenario, the planner is more 
concerned about expanding his output share than expanding output itself. The following 
condition must hold:
 24 
) 2 ( ) 2 min( ) 2 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 min( ) 1 ( ) )( ( L H H L H L H L H H Y Y z z Y Y λ λ φ φ τ λ λ − < − − + ≤ − ,               (11) 
                                                 
22 Hypothetically, under perfect foresight, the ruler could levy a lump sum tax  ) (τ  on the 
planner that would always satisfy the high-effort condition. However, as we discussed 
earlier, the range of permissible τ is restricted. 
23 It can be shown that a combination of low-effort incentives in the first period and high-
effort incentives in the second one (L, H) is not an equilibrium outcome. 
24 Notice that since the difference  L H z z −  is identical in both periods,  H λ  remains constant. 
However, since output increases over time (due to technological progress),  min λ is lower in 
period 2 than in period 1.   -  15 - 
 
that is, in the second period, the fine for producing low output is smaller than the planner￿s 
share of extra output under high-effort. 
  What is the driving force behind this switching of effort/output from high to low? 
In our model aggregate output, Y, and its share to be allocated to managers, λ , are functions 
of technological progress, ε . Technological progress may increase aggregate output and 
decrease managers￿ reservation share of output,  min λ , so that the planner￿s additional share of 
output exceeds the fine associated with low-effort. If we were to allow other changes in the 
model, a similar impact would have an increase in the managers￿ endowment, 
M w , a 
decrease in their reservation consumption, cmin, or an exogenous decrease in γ.  
Finally, we examine the welfare implications of the high-effort and low-effort 
equilibrium mix. We compare it to the optimal solution, which can be  derived by 
maximizing the aggregate consumption subject to feasibility constraints, that is maximizing 
the aggregate consumption subject to (4) and (5). Solving this problem, it follows that high 
effort is optimal in both periods if the following condition below is satisfied in both periods: 
1
) )( (
≤
− − L H L H z z φ φ
γ
.                                  (12)       
We stress two observations regarding the optimality of the equilibrium solution. First, 
the condition (12) is identical to a situation where the managers get the entire output,  1 = λ . 
Hence, we find a range of parameters, where high effort would be the optimal solution, but 
managers put in low effort,  ) )( ( ) )( ( L H L H L H L H z z z z − − ≤ < − − φ φ γ φ φ λ , see Figure 2. 
This is the result of managers receiving only a fraction λ of additional output while 
internalizing all the cost of additional effort, γ. Paradoxically, the aggregate additional effort 
may be much smaller than the aggregate gain in output. -  16 - 
 
Figure 2.  Cost of Effort-Output Relationship 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Second, since the condition (12) is identical in both periods, the effort must be also 
identical in both periods in the optimum, and hence the high-low equilibrium cannot be an 
optimal, output-maximizing solution. Defining  L H z z − = σ , in the (H, L) equilibrium, the 
following condition holds:  σ φ φ σ φ φ λ γ σ φ φ λ ) ( ) ( ) ( 1 2 L H L H L H − ≤ − ≤ < − , where  1 λ  
denotes manager￿s share of output in period 1 and  2 λ  share of output in period 2. While high 
effort is an optimal solution in both periods, given the share of output they receive in period 
2, the managers put only low effort into the production during that period. 
Incremental output 
γ 
γ
Social gain, θ 
Managers￿ gain, λθ 
θ1  θ2 
Notes: Let θ = (φH − φL)  ) ( ) ( ) ( t L t H z z − . For  1 θ θ < , the cost of high effort, γ , is larger than both the 
social gain of the incremental, high-effort output  (φH − φL) ) ( L H z z −  and the share that goes to the 
managers, λ(φH − φL) ) ( L H z z − . Similarly, for  2 θ θ > , γ  is smaller than both the social and 
managers￿ gain. However, for  2 1 θ θ θ ≤ ≤ , the social gain is larger than γ  but smaller than the 
managers￿ gain. -  17 - 
 
Policy Implications 
Based on our model, the two main conclusions regarding behavior of the planner in 
centrally planned economies can be made. First, unless a sufficiently high penalty for 
offering low-effort incentives is available, output targets would not lead to high effort (and 
high output) in the long run. Second, as long as the planner maximizes his own consumption, 
he may not be interested in formulating the socially optimal plan. 
A few other points are also worth summarizing. The high effort necessary for high 
sustainable growth is generated only by the allocation of sufficiently large shares of output to 
managers. If either the managers￿ ￿reservation consumption￿ decreases or if the fine that can 
be imposed on the planner for low output declines, the economy may end up in the low-effort 
equilibrium. Also, other things being equal, the economy is likely to switch from a 
high-effort outcome in the first period to a low-effort outcome in the second period, provided 
the technological progress has been sufficiently strong to satisfy the managers￿ reservation 
consumption, even at low-effort output. 
These results seem to be consistent with the CEE countries empirical evidence. Not 
only was the state redistributing an increasingly larger share of output, but more and more of 
this redistribution was wasteful, such as the expenditures on defense spending, subsidies to 
loss-making firms, and so on. Moreover, the punishment for underperformance declined over 
time. As the bureaucratic structures became entrenched, those planners/managers that were 
members of the elite had increasing job and personal emoluments security. -  18 - 
 
We generalize that output targets in centrally planned economies are likely to have a 
medium- to long-term adverse impact on economic performance as long as the planner tries 
to confiscate a large share of output and the planner￿s fine for underperformance vis-￿-vis 
potential output relatively declines over time. Although high-effort outputs could have been 
achieved hypothetically by fine-tuning the penalty, reality suggests that there were severe 
limits to this option. The implications of our model are straightforward: initially successful 
centrally planned economies were destined to endure gradually declining growth rates. 
 
IV.   CONCLUSIONS 
Planned economies are usually less efficient than economies in which agents are free 
to choose their output targets as well as the means to meet them. Historically, market 
economies have outperformed command ones by a wide margin. However, economists agree 
relatively little on what is the main source of this difference. In this paper we provide a 
complementary model to the mainstream explanations in the literature, and we argue that the 
main cause of the mediocre performance of planned economic systems follows from the very 
nature of the contract between the planner and the managers. 
Drawing on the available empirical evidence, we model an economic system in which 
the planner, under certain conditions, has strong incentives not to choose the ambitious plan. 
In particular, these conditions include sufficiently strong technological progress, an increase 
in the managers￿ reservation consumption, or a lack of sufficiently high penalty imposed on a 
planner for designing an incentive scheme leading to low effort/low output. In a future 
research, an interesting extension would be to incorporate monitoring problems and 
corruption explicitly to the model. -  19 - 
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